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ABSTRACT—The rough equivalence of certification and ultimate outcome 
is class action dogma. If certification is granted, then the plaintiff “wins” 
by settlement because the risk of incurring class-wide liability by going to 
trial is too great. If certification is denied, the defendant “wins” because the 
case may not be worth litigating without the possibility of a class-wide 
recovery. This Note is about where the dogma is wrong. There are now 
cases where a denial of certification, just like a grant, presents to the 
defendant the risk of incurring class-wide liability at trial. This is because 
those cases are capable of what I call jury certification. Thanks to recent 
case law, there are now cases where the jury will decide an issue when it 
passes on the merits that is the same issue that the judge first decided 
during certification. The merits and class certification overlap on that issue. 
That overlap gives the jury’s verdict the power to, in effect, overrule the 
judge’s decision to deny certification. Thus, a defendant facing a certified 
class and a defendant facing an uncertified class capable of jury 
certification are in the same bargaining position—going to trial means 
risking class-wide liability. Here, I will explain how jury certification could 
work in federal securities class actions, where the conditions for jury 
certification are often found. 
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Class certification decides federal securities fraud class actions.1 With 
few exceptions, certified classes settle and classes denied certification are 
abandoned.2 And within a subset of securities class actions, those alleging 
misstatement-based securities fraud in violation of Securities and Exchange 
Commission Rule 10b-5, certification often turns on just one of its 
requirements: predominance.3 Securities fraud class actions can only be 
certified if common questions of fact or law “predominate,” that is, if the 
questions common to a class’s claims outweigh individual questions.4 
Normally, fraud cases cannot be certified because reliance—did the 
plaintiff reasonably rely on the defendant’s misstatement—is a 
quintessentially individual question.5 
So, typically, reliance destroys predominance.6 But in securities fraud, 
reliance can sometimes be presumed,7 and since the presumption applies to 
 
1 By “federal securities fraud class action,” I mean a securities fraud class action brought under 
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012)) and 
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012)). 
2 See, e.g., DONNA M. NAGY ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT 429 (3d ed. 
2011) (“The court’s decision on certification carries enormous significance for all concerned. If 
certification is denied, most (and possibly all) members of the might-have-been class will lose the 
opportunity to recover because they lack the resources to sue individually. On the other hand, a grant of 
certification may so increase the defendant’s potential damages liability and litigation costs that he may 
find it economically prudent to settle and to abandon a meritorious defense.” (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
3 See e.g., Bell v. Ascendant Solutions, Inc., No. Civ.A. 301CV0166N, 2004 WL 1490009, at *5 
(N.D. Tex. July 1, 2004) (denying class certification solely based on predominance).  
4 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
5 See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 242, 243–44 (1988) (plurality opinion) (“Requiring 
proof of individualized reliance from each member of the proposed plaintiff class effectively would 
have prevented respondents from proceeding with a class action, since individual issues then would 
have overwhelmed the common ones.”). 
6 See id.  
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the entire class, common questions predominate.8 Thus, certification in 
securities fraud class actions involving misstatements often comes down to 
whether a presumption—called the fraud-on-the-market presumption9—
applies. If it does, predominance is satisfied, and these securities fraud 
class actions tend to easily satisfy the other class certification 
requirements.10 Whether the presumption applies, in turn, depends on 
whether the security involved in the alleged fraud traded on a so-called 
“efficient market.”11 
In sum: if the market was efficient, the presumption applies; if the 
presumption applies, predominance is satisfied; if predominance is 
satisfied, the class is certified; and, if the class is certified, the plaintiff, in 
effect, wins. It all comes down to the judge’s market-efficiency finding on 
class certification. So it has been and so it is today. 
In this Note, I try to upset that paradigm. I believe that defendants may 
now want to settle—with the entire class—even if the judge finds the 
relevant market inefficient and therefore denies certification. The reason 
boils down to what I call jury certification. The reason defendants settle 
when classes are certified is because going forward with the case means 
risking class-wide liability at trial.12 Jury certification creates this same risk 
in cases where the judge denies certification. 
How? Jury certification is shorthand for a series of procedural steps a 
plaintiff can take to, in effect, reverse the judge’s initial denial of 
certification after a jury trial but before final judgment is entered. Thus, a 
defendant facing a freshly certified class stands in the same position as a 
defendant facing an individual plaintiff who has just been denied 
certification but has jury certification available. Both defendants must 
choose between settling now or risking class-wide liability at trial. 
 
7 See id. at 247 (discussing presumption); see also Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 
U.S. 128, 152–54 (1972) (approving presumption based on material omissions).  
8 Basic, 485 U.S. at 242 (plurality opinion). 
9 In sum, the fraud-on-the-market presumption is based on the economic theory that, in an efficient 
market, all public information is incorporated into the price of a security. Thus, anyone who bought at 
the market price relied on all the public statements made about the security. See id. at 245–47 (plurality 
opinion); Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1143 (1982). 
10 See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The Unjustified Judicial Creation of Class 
Certification Merits Trials in Securities Fraud Actions, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323, 325–26 (2010) 
(“The dispositive issues [on class certification] for securities class actions are often whether common 
issues of loss causation or reliance predominate.”). 
11 See In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 42–43 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding the 
presumption did not apply as the plaintiffs failed to prove an efficient market); Gariety v. Grant 
Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 364 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting four requirements for the presumption to 
apply, including that the shares traded on an efficient market).  
12 See, e.g., William Simon, Class Actions—Useful Tool or Engine of Destruction, 55 F.R.D. 375, 
380 (1973) (“[C]ertification of a broad class often determines the entire case by coercing the defendants 
to settle even unmeritorious claims.”). 
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Admittedly, jury certification only works in some cases. The judge 
must have denied certification solely based on a lack of predominance, and 
specifically a lack of predominance based on a finding of market 
inefficiency. Other than predominance, all the other certification 
requirements must have been found to be met.13 Many, many, securities 
class actions satisfy this condition.14 Assuming the condition is met, there 
are three paths to jury certification. All three paths begin with the 
individual plaintiff, who has just been denied class certification, proceeding 
to and winning a jury trial. This is counter to the usual practice. Usually, 
plaintiffs abandon their case if denied certification (with an exception being 
plaintiffs with massive individual damages, like institutional investors).15 
But jury certification requires plaintiffs to press on and win. At the moment 
the jury finds the defendant liable for securities fraud, the three paths 
diverge. 
First, a post-verdict plaintiff can immediately ask the judge to amend 
the order denying certification with a motion under Rule 23(c).16 When it 
found liability, the jury, in effect, disagreed with the judge’s earlier finding 
on market efficiency; it had to or it could not have found the defendant 
liable. Market efficiency is both a certification requirement, in that it is 
necessary to satisfy predominance, and an element of the plaintiff’s cause 
of action, in that it is necessary to prove reliance.17 Moreover, the jury is 
free to disagree with the judge, since the judge’s class certification finding 
is not binding on the jury.18 By filing the Rule 23(c) motion, the plaintiff is 
asking the judge to substitute the jury’s finding for her own. Under the 
jury’s view, the market was efficient, and therefore, common questions 
could predominate. And since the individual plaintiff was a member of the 
 
13 A putative class must meet all four Rule 23(a) requirements and the requirements of at least one 
of the four types of class actions laid out in Rule 23(b) for certification. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
14 Relatively recent examples of large securities class actions that fit this bill include: In re 
PolyMedica Corp. Securities Litigation, 432 F.3d 1, 3 n.4 (1st Cir. 2005); Bell v. Ascendant Solutions, 
Inc., No. Civ.A. 301CV0166N, 2004 WL 1490009, at *4–5 (N.D. Tex. July 1, 2004); Krogman v. 
Sterritt, 202 F.R.D. 467, 471–73 (N.D. Tex. 2001). 
15 See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469–70 (1978) (“[W]ithout the incentive of a 
possible group recovery the individual plaintiff may find it economically imprudent to pursue his 
lawsuit to a final judgment . . . .”); see generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial 
Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 904–
06 (1987) (breaking class actions into three categories based on marketability of individual claims). 
16 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C). 
17 See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2185 (2011) (“It is undisputed 
that securities fraud plaintiffs must prove certain things in order to invoke Basic’s rebuttable 
presumption of reliance. It is common ground, for example, that plaintiffs must demonstrate . . . that the 
stock traded in an efficient market . . . .” (citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 n.27 
(1988))); id. at 2184 (“Reliance by the plaintiff upon the defendant’s deceptive acts is an essential 
element of the § 10(b) private cause of action.” (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-
Atlantic, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
18 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 n.6 (2011) (“[The overlapped issue is] 
an issue they will surely have to prove again at trial in order to make out their case on the merits.”). 
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class, her claim is identical to those of the class; the liability finding on 
behalf of the individual plaintiff applies to the whole class. By winning her 
own case, the plaintiff has won the same trial the class would have won. 
Rule 23(c) can turn an individual plaintiff’s win into a win for the class. 
But judges have a great deal of discretion on Rule 23(c) motions.19 If 
the motion is denied, path number two provides a “Plan B.” To follow the 
second path to jury certification, the plaintiff allows the case to terminate in 
a final, individual judgment. Then, with another member of the class as 
plaintiff, a second, identical class action is filed. When the time comes for 
the class certification motion, the judgment in the first case sets up 
collateral estoppel, preventing the defendant from arguing that the market 
was inefficient.20 In the usual securities fraud case, certification turns on 
market efficiency because the other certification requirements are easily 
met, as they were in the first case. Thus, with the prior judgment in hand, 
the second plaintiff should easily obtain class certification and, shortly 
thereafter, a class-wide settlement. 
The third path is a variation on the second. Like the second, this path 
involves two cases. But, unlike the second, for the third path, only the 
second case is a class action. It is not necessary that the first case be filed as 
or attempt to gain certification as a class action. Collateral estoppel can set 
up class certification in the second case so long as the first case’s plaintiff 
has the same claim as the plaintiff class.21 
Admittedly, all paths to jury certification are long and uncertain. They 
require judges to make decisions for which they have considerable 
discretion.22 A judge who believes that the Rule 23(c) motion or collateral 
estoppel involves substantial unfairness to the defendant is well within her 
rights to refuse either.23 But, for two reasons, this does not make jury 
certification any less viable. First, forewarned is forearmed. To avoid a 
claim of prejudice, the plaintiff need only put the defendant on notice of 
her plans.24 If the defendant has been warned that jury certification is 
contemplated, then it is the defendant’s own fault for not taking the 
 
19 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 1785.4 (3d ed. 2005) (“However, it must be noted that there is no requirement that 
the court alter its class-action order when the circumstances surrounding its initial determination 
change. The decision to amend a class-certification order is discretionary.”). 
20 See generally Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326–33 (1979) (describing use 
of collateral estoppel in a securities case). 
21 See id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). 
22 See 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19; Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331 (“We have concluded that 
the preferable approach for dealing with these problems in the federal courts is not to preclude the use 
of offensive collateral estoppel, but to grant trial courts broad discretion to determine when it should be 
applied.”). 
23 See 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19; Parklane, 439 U.S. at 331.  
24 See Kilgo v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 789 F.2d 859, 877–78 (11th Cir. 1986) (permitting a post-
trial expansion of the class because notice deprived the defendant of a claim of prejudice). 
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individual plaintiff’s case seriously. Second, jury certification does not 
need to be a sure thing to “work.” Rather, it works if the defendant settles, 
and the defendant will settle based on its evaluation of the risk that the 
plaintiff will succeed. Defendants who are unwilling to brave that risk will 
settle. 
And those settlements are significant. Currently, many securities fraud 
class actions are abandoned when judges deny certification solely on 
market-inefficiency grounds. Those cases are tallied in the defense win 
column. Jury certification could, potentially, put some of those many cases, 
involving many hundreds of millions of dollars,25 back in the plaintiff’s 
column. Accordingly, jury certification is literally a multi-million dollar 
proposition. 
But, in spite of this, no plaintiff has yet tried it.26 This should not be 
surprising. The normal practice—certify and settle; lose certification and 
abandon—is longstanding. The modern securities class action has been 
around since 1966.27 But only recently has the case law evolved in a way 
that would allow jury certification. The key is what I call the overlap 
interpretation. 
The overlap interpretation is an explanation of the interaction of Rule 
23’s class certification requirements and the elements of a substantive 
cause of action, like securities fraud. Under the overlap interpretation, a 
particular element of the plaintiff’s claim is said to overlap with a 
certification requirement.28 To get certified, the plaintiff must prove the 
element. If the case is certified, then the plaintiff will have to prove the 
element again at trial.29 In securities fraud the overlap is on market 
efficiency—it is both a merits element, because it proves reliance, and it is 
also considered necessary to show predominance.30 
 
25 See generally Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 
1465, 1497–98 & 1497 n.159 (2004) (providing examples of settlement amounts). 
26 Proving a negative is difficult. I base this statement on a thorough survey of reported cases, 
academic writing, and practitioner journals. 
27 See Simon, supra note 12, at 375–76 (describing how the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 created 
the modern class action). 
28 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 (2011) (“In this case, proof of 
commonality necessarily overlaps with respondents’ merits contention that Wal–Mart engages in a 
pattern or practice of discrimination.” (first emphasis added)). 
29 Id. at 2552 n.6. 
30 See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2185 (2011) (“It is undisputed 
that securities fraud plaintiffs must prove certain things in order to invoke Basic’s rebuttable 
presumption of reliance. It is common ground, for example, that plaintiffs must demonstrate . . . that the 
stock traded in an efficient market . . . .” (citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 n.27 (1988) 
(plurality opinion))); id. at 2184 (“Reliance by the plaintiff upon the defendant’s deceptive acts is an 
essential element of the § 10(b) private cause of action.” (quoting Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. 
Scientific-Atlantic, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 159 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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Practically speaking, the overlap interpretation does three things. First, 
it makes class certification harder to obtain.31 It was not long ago that all a 
securities fraud plaintiff needed to do to satisfy the predominance 
requirement was plead the fraud-on-the-market theory.32 The overlap 
interpretation requires them to prove its applicability by proving market 
efficiency. The difference is enormous: alleging versus proving. The 
second point is related to the first. Forcing plaintiffs to prove market 
efficiency makes class certification more expensive.33 Class certification 
motions involving the overlap interpretation now come after enormous 
amounts of discovery, laden with expert opinions and exhibits.34 This cost 
hits both plaintiffs and defendants, who will prepare and file their own 
expert opinions to counter the plaintiff’s. 
The third thing that the overlap interpretation does is what makes jury 
certification possible: it gives juries a say in class certification. Thanks to 
the overlap interpretation, the jury decides a certification requirement when 
it decides the merits of the plaintiff’s case. Without the overlap 
interpretation, jury certification would be impossible. 
The remainder of this Note has three Parts. In Part I, I briefly introduce 
key class action concepts, including a description of the overlap 
interpretation. Part II goes, step-by-step, through jury certification and 
closes by suggesting some countermeasures that defendants might employ 
against it. A conclusion follows. 
I. CLASS ACTIONS, CLASS CERTIFICATION, AND THE OVERLAP 
INTERPRETATION 
For those unfamiliar with class action litigation, this Part will 
introduce basic principles. Section A deals with the class action generally. 
Section B deals with class certification, describing its requirements and its 
legal and practical significance. Sections C and D describe the two recent 
 
31 See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 10, at 330 (“This growing trend requires plaintiffs to 
establish more and more of their securities fraud claims on a Rule 23 hearing.”). 
32 See Unger v. Amedisys, Inc., No. 01-703, 2003 WL 25739165, at *5–6 (M.D. La. Aug. 1, 2003) 
(certifying the class based on plaintiff’s allegations that market was efficient); Herbst v. Able, 47 
F.R.D. 11, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (“Defendants argue strenuously that this case involves predominantly 
individual questions of reliance, and that plaintiffs’ theory of market fraud is inapplicable to a case 
involving the conversion of debt securities into equity securities. The court finds that these arguments 
go to the merits of plaintiffs’ case rather than to the question of the maintenance of a class action in 
accordance with the manner in which plaintiffs seek to proceed.”).  
33 See Brief for Respondents at 10–11, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 
10-277), 2011 WL 686407, at *10–11 (“After extensive discovery, including over 200 depositions, 
production of more than a million pages of documents, and electronic personnel data, plaintiffs 
assembled a massive record to support class certification.”). 
34 See id.; see also Steig D. Olson, “Chipping Away”: The Misguided Trend Toward Resolving 
Merits Disputes as Part of the Class Certification Calculus, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 935, 955 (2009) 
(criticizing the overlap interpretation based on cost). 
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developments in class certification law that give rise to the possibility of 
jury certification: the overlap interpretation and, to a lesser extent, the 
preponderance standard. I note from the outset that I take no normative 
stance on either the state of class certification law or the place of class 
actions in litigation. I will, however, occasionally cite or discuss cases and 
scholarship that do. 
A. The Class Action 
A class action is a representative action.35 A single person or small 
group—the class representative or representatives—brings a case alleging 
that they and others like them—the absent class members—have been 
wronged by the defendant. Instead of bringing multiple lawsuits or all 
joining in the same lawsuit, class action rules allow the representatives to 
litigate on behalf of absentees, all as one class, and without the absentees’ 
involvement or, sometimes, even their knowledge.36 
Obviously, allowing one litigant to represent another creates the 
opportunity for the representative to take advantage of the absentee. A 
simple example would be a sellout: the class representative, sometimes 
called the named plaintiff, might be willing to “sell” the class’s claims 
cheaply in a settlement so long as the defendant compensates the named 
plaintiff, or possibly the named plaintiff’s attorney, at a premium.37 To 
prevent sellouts and similar problems, would-be class representatives need 
judicial permission to litigate on a class’s behalf.38 
First, an individual plaintiff will file a complaint that identifies the 
case as a putative class action. Then, the plaintiff will ask the court to 
“certify” the class.39 Certification is permission. By moving for 
certification, the would-be representative is asking the judge for permission 
to represent the class. In federal courts, Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure determines who gets that permission and who does not.40 
 
35 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (“One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative 
parties on behalf of all members . . . .”). 
36 In class actions brought under Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2), notice to the absent class members is not 
required. Id. 23(c)(2)(A). For class actions brought under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must provide to class 
members the “best notice that is practicable under the circumstances.” Id. 23(c)(2)(B). Accordingly, 
absent class members may be unaware that their rights are being adjudicated.  
37 See, e.g., Assaf Hamdani & Alon Klement, The Class Defense, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 685, 728 
(2005) (discussing reverse auctions). 
38 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1)(A) (“At an early practicable time after a person sues or is sued as a 
class representative, the court must determine by order whether to certify the action as a class action.”). 
39 Id. 
40 See id. 23. 
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B. Class Certification 
Two aspects of class certification are important here: its legal 
requirements—the certification requirements—and its practical 
significance. If certification is permission, then certification’s significance 
flows from what the representative is permitted to do once certified. 
1. The Certification Requirements.—Rule 23 contains the 
requirements for class certification in federal court.41 To be certified, a 
putative class must meet all four Rule 23(a) requirements and the 
requirements of at least one of the four types of class actions laid out in 
Rule 23(b).42 Generally, the requirements are meant to ensure two things: 
that the class representative will adequately protect the interests of the 
absent class members43 and that the case will “work” as a class action.44 
By “work” I mean two things. First, it means that the class 
representative will, by proving her own claim, at the same time be proving 
the claims of the absent class members. Second, it means that the case must 
be one of a type that the rule deems appropriate for class treatment. After 
all, “[t]he class action is ‘an exception to the usual rule that litigation is 
conducted by and on behalf of the individual named parties only.’”45 The 
exception only applies, per Rule 23, to four types of cases.46 
2. Class Certification’s Significance.—Class certification is central 
to class litigation because of its legal and practical significance.47 The legal 
significance of certification is that absent members of a certified class are 
bound to the result of the litigation.48 If the class is not certified, or 
decertified before a final judgment is entered, then the litigation has no 
 
41 See id. 23(a), (b). 
42 Id. The four types are generally referred to by their numbers: 23(b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B), (b)(2), and 
(b)(3). Id. 23(b). 
43 See id. 23(a)(4) (“[T]he representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of 
the class.”). 
44 See id. 23(b)(3) (instructing judges to consider whether the class action is “superior to other 
available methods” for deciding the case, including whether there are “likely difficulties in managing a 
class action”). 
45 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550 (2011) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 
442 U.S. 682, 700–01 (1979)). 
46 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 
47 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process, and the Right to Opt Out of Class 
Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1060 (2002) (“Courts are well aware that the decision to certify 
or not radically alters the incentive structure of litigation, as reflected in the creation of the interlocutory 
appeal mechanisms of Rule 23(f).”). 
48 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B)(vii) (directing courts to give notice to classes certified under 
Rule 23(b)(3) of “the binding effect of a class judgment on members”); see generally Smith v. Bayer 
Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2380 (2011) (“Neither a proposed class action nor a rejected class action may 
bind nonparties. What does have this effect is a class action approved under Rule 23.”).  
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binding effect on their rights.49 An interesting consequence of this, recently 
confirmed by the Supreme Court, is that members of a putative class that is 
denied certification by one court can bring the same case and seek class 
certification in another court.50 
The practical significance of class certification is a product of its legal 
significance. Certification gives the class representative permission to try 
or settle the absent class members’ claims.51 Prior to class certification, the 
class representative is a representative in name only; nothing she does 
affects the rights of the absent class members.52 This has enormous 
strategic consequences. As Judge Easterbrook concretely put it, 
certification transforms $200,000 cases into $200,000,000 cases.53 
Certification is the difference between a nuisance and a “bet the company” 
case.54 
On the other hand, if the judge denies class certification, that often 
means the end of the case.55 The individual claims of the class 
representative may not be worth enough to justify paying a lawyer to 
pursue them. Cases like this are often abandoned if class certification is 
denied.56 So class certification has big stakes for both sides. If the plaintiff 
wins, the defendant may risk liabilities in excess of its assets. If the 
 
49 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2); see generally Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 2379–81 (finding that class 
certification is a “precondition” for binding class members to suit outcome). 
50 Bayer Corporation effectively overruled In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., Tires Products 
Liability Litigation, 333 F.3d 763, 769 (7th Cir. 2003), which had held that a denial of certification was 
binding on the class members. Bayer Corporation acknowledged the policy behind the Bridgestone 
decision: there is “an asymmetric system in which class counsel can win but never lose” because they 
can relitigate certification. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 2381 (quoting Bridgestone, 333 F.3d at 767) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
51 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23. This permission is subject to Rule 23(e), which requires court approval 
for class settlements. Id. 23(e) (“The claims . . . of a certified class may be settled . . . only with the 
court’s approval.”). 
52 Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 2380 (“Neither a proposed class action nor a rejected class action may 
bind nonparties.”). 
53 Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001). 
54 In addition to Szabo, id., these cases refer to class actions as “bet the company” or “bet-your-
company” cases: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011); Blue Cross Blue 
Shield of Mass., Inc. v. BCS Ins. Co., 671 F.3d 635, 639 (7th Cir. 2011); Creative Montessori Learning 
Ctrs. v. Ashford Gear LLC, 662 F.3d 913, 915 (7th Cir. 2011); Stillmock v. Weis Mkts., Inc., 385 F. 
App’x 267, 279 (4th Cir. 2010); Kohen v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co., 571 F.3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2009); 
Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 547 F.3d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 2008); In re Visa 
Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 152 (2d Cir. 2001) (Jacobs, J., dissenting). This list 
is by no means exhaustive, and represents only the past ten years or so of appellate cases.  
55 See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 469–70 (1978) (“[W]ithout the incentive of a 
possible group recovery the individual plaintiff may find it economically imprudent to pursue his 
lawsuit to a final judgment . . . .”).  
56 See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing 
Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 904–06 (1987) (breaking 
class actions into three categories based on marketability of individual claims). 
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defendant wins, the plaintiff may be forced to give up her case without a 
determination on the merits. 
I would like to emphasize the significance of these stakes by 
introducing the reader to the debate about just how high they are. As I 
noted in the Introduction, many prominent legal thinkers believe that class 
actions, and specifically class certification, amount to legalized blackmail.57 
For ease of reference, I will call this group “the blackmail camp.” 
There are many familiar and influential names in the blackmail camp. 
Justice Scalia58 and Judges Friendly,59 Easterbook,60 and Posner61 have used 
and continue to use words like “blackmail” to describe the pressure 
defendants feel when facing the risk of class-wide liability. Justice Scalia’s 
recent opinion in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion contains language 
typical of the group: “Faced with even a small chance of a devastating loss, 
defendants will be pressured into settling questionable claims.”62 So 
influential is the blackmail camp that they have turned class-certification-
as-blackmail into an argument against class certification itself.63 And the 
Advisory Committee’s Notes to Rule 23(f), which provide an exception to 
the final judgment rule and give parties a conditional right to appeal a 
denial or grant of class certification, treat the threat of blackmail in favor of 
allowing an appeal.64 
 
57 See, e.g., HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 119–20 (1973) 
(calling class action settlements that defendants agree to because of a probability of a huge class 
judgment “blackmail settlements”); Simon, supra note 12, at 375 (equating class actions in antitrust and 
securities cases with “legalized blackmail” (quoting Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to 
Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9 (1971)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); see also Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 
78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1357, 1360–61 (2003) (“Judges Friendly, Posner, and Easterbrook are towering 
figures in American jurisprudence and cannot be dismissed as ideologues.”). 
58 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752 (Scalia, J.) (“Faced with even a small chance of a devastating 
loss, defendants will be pressured into settling questionable claims.”). 
59 See FRIENDLY, supra note 57, at 120 (calling class action settlements that defendants agree to 
because of a small probability of a huge class judgment “blackmail settlements”). 
60 See Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Such 
a claim puts a bet-your-company decision to Bridgeport’s managers and may induce a substantial 
settlement even if the customers’ position is weak.”). 
61 See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.) (“Judge 
Friendly, who was not given to hyperbole, called settlements induced by a small probability of an 
immense judgment in a class action ‘blackmail settlements.’ Judicial concern about them is 
legitimate . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
62 See Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1752.  
63 See Silver, supra note 57, at 1358 (“‘Hydraulic pressure . . . to settle’ is now a recognized 
objection to class certification.” (quoting Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 
F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2001))). 
64 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (1998) (“An order granting certification, on the 
other hand, may force a defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of defending a class action and 
run the risk of potentially ruinous liability.”); see also Szabo, 249 F.3d at 675 (granting interlocutory 
appeal under 23(f) because of settlement pressure).  
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The blackmail camp has ensconced its thesis in the case law and in the 
class action rule itself. But its opponents deride it as a myth.65 The 
opponents have a variety of arguments, among them that there is no 
empirical verification for the blackmail claim.66 Primarily, the opponents 
contend that (1) if the settled cases were truly meritless then the defendant 
would file a dispositive motion rather than settle and67 (2) so long as the 
cases are not meritless, there is nothing normatively wrong about 
pressuring defendants to settle.68 
For my purposes, it is what the opponents do not say that is most 
important. The opponents of the blackmail camp do not argue that class 
certification exerts no or minimal pressure on defendants to settle. On the 
existence of pressure, many agree with the blackmail camp—the pressure is 
there, and it is enormous. Likewise, there appears to be no disagreement 
that the pressure itself is based on the size of the potential liability.69 That is 
significant because it makes jury certification a viable strategy. 
All agree that the risk of class-wide liability pressures the defendant to 
settle. And, as I mentioned in the Introduction, that is exactly the kind of 
pressure that jury certification or, as we will see, the possibility of jury 
certification can bring to bear. 
C. The Overlap Interpretation 
This section discusses the overlap interpretation. What I call the 
overlap interpretation is the view—now prevailing in the federal courts—
that when plaintiffs bring class actions alleging certain causes of action, 
one or another of Rule 23’s class certification requirements “overlaps” with 
an element of that cause of action. Therefore, the plaintiff must prove that 
element to obtain certification. Then, assuming the judge certifies the class, 
the plaintiff must prove the element again at trial, because the judge’s 
finding of whether the overlapped element is met for certification purposes 
is not binding on the jury.70 
 
65 Note the title: Allan Kanner & Tibor Nagy, Exploding the Blackmail Myth: A New Perspective 
on Class Action Settlements, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 681 (2005). 
66 See id. at 697 (describing the similarity in rates of settlement for certified class actions and 
conventional lawsuits and concluding that “the Blackmail Myth quite simply does not comport with 
reality”). 
67 See Kanner & Nagy, supra note 65, at 696. 
68 See, e.g., Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241, 1274 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[I]f their fears are truly 
justified, the defendants can blame no one but themselves.”).  
69 But see Kanner & Nagy, supra note 65, at 696–97. 
70 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 n.6 (2011) (“[The overlapped issue is] 
an issue they will surely have to prove again at trial in order to make out their case on the merits.”); 
Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 2004). 
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The overlap interpretation shows up routinely in two types of class 
actions71: federal employment discrimination class actions72 and federal 
securities fraud class actions.73 In securities fraud cases the overlap is often 
between the “efficient market” requirement and predominance.74 
Predominance comes from Rule 23(b)(3).75 It is shorthand for saying that 
“questions of law or fact common to the class members predominate over 
any questions affecting only individual members.”76 The predominance 
requirement ensures that the class action will consume less judicial time 
than individual actions.77 The existence of an efficient market for the 
security at issue in the case is also a prerequisite to proving an element of 
the plaintiff’s case for liability.78 That element is reliance: securities fraud 
plaintiffs need to prove reliance,79 sometimes called transaction causation.80 
If the plaintiff proves an efficient market, the plaintiff almost certainly 
will obtain the so-called fraud-on-the-market presumption.81 This is a 
 
71 Breach of warranty class actions are another type of class action where overlap occurs. See 
Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 674 (7th Cir. 2001) (describing overlap in breach of 
warranty class action). 
72 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2546–47 (reversing certification of plaintiff class in 
employment discrimination class action brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006)). It is also worth noting that the conditions for jury certification 
probably arise more often in securities litigation than in employment discrimination. This is because, 
based on my review of cases, it often appears that certification is denied in employment discrimination 
on more than just the overlapped requirement. And jury certification is only possible where only the 
overlapped requirement is the grounds for denial. See infra Part II.A.1. 
73 See, e.g., Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2183, 2187 (2011) 
(vacating denial of class certification for class brought under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 and remanding for further proceedings). 
74 See, e.g., In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 26, 41–43 (2d Cir. 2006); Gariety, 
368 F.3d at 366. 
75 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) (“A class action may be maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if: . . . the 
court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions 
affecting only individual members . . . .”). 
76 Id. 
77 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (1966) (“It is only where this predominance 
exists that economies can be achieved by means of the class-action device.”). 
78 See Erica, 131 S. Ct. at 2185 (“It is undisputed that securities fraud plaintiffs must prove certain 
things in order to invoke Basic’s rebuttable presumption of reliance. It is common ground, for example, 
that plaintiffs must demonstrate . . . that the stock traded in an efficient market . . . .” (citing Basic, Inc. 
v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 n.27 (1988) (plurality opinion))); see also Jeffrey L. Oldham, Comment, 
Taking “Efficient Markets” Out of the Fraud-on-the-Market Doctrine After the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 995 (2003) (arguing that an efficient market is not the 
appropriate prerequisite to application of the theory); Note, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, supra 
note 9 (discussing the theory and its application in securities litigation).  
79 Erica, 131 S. Ct. at 2184. 
80 NAGY ET AL., supra note 2, at 149 (“[R]eliance (also known as transaction causation) . . . .”).  
81 See Erica, 131 S. Ct. at 2184–85 (“It is undisputed that securities fraud plaintiffs must prove 
certain things in order to invoke Basic’s rebuttable presumption of reliance. It is common ground, for 
example, that plaintiffs must demonstrate . . . that the stock traded in an efficient market . . . .” (citing 
Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 n.27 (plurality opinion))). 
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presumption of reliance.82 All fraud plaintiffs (i.e., whether alleging 
securities or some other type of fraud) must show reliance: that they acted 
in reliance on the defendant’s alleged misstatement.83 Reliance is an 
individual question and therefore usually destroys predominance and, with 
it, any hope of certification.84 If every member of the class had to show 
individual reliance, then common questions wouldn’t predominate, and no 
class could be certified.85 But the fraud-on-the-market presumption of 
reliance replaces individual reliance based on the idea that, in an efficient 
market, the market incorporates all public information, including the 
defendant’s misstatements, into the price of a security.86 Thus, anyone who 
bought at the market price relied on the misstatements simply by buying at 
the market price.87 To obtain the presumption and, with it, predominance 
and class certification, a plaintiff must prove the presumption’s 
prerequisite: that the market for the security is efficient.88 
1. Criticisms of the Overlap Interpretation.—Not everyone agrees 
that the overlap interpretation is correct.89 And some have argued that, 
correct or not, it causes significant problems.90 A main complaint is cost.91 
If a plaintiff must prove an element of its case to get certification, it must 
have discovery, causing delay and expense.92 For example, the Wal-Mart 
case took almost two years from the complaint until the plaintiffs filed their 
class certification motion.93 During that time, the parties exchanged more 
than a million pages of documents and took more than 200 depositions.94 
 
82 Id. 
83 See Basic, 485 U.S. at 243 (plurality opinion) (“[R]eliance is and long has been an element of 
common-law fraud . . . .”).  
84 Id. at 242 (“Requiring proof of individualized reliance from each member of the proposed 
plaintiff class effectively would have prevented respondents from proceeding with a class action, since 
individual issues then would have overwhelmed the common ones.”). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 247 (“An investor who buys or sells stock at the price set by the market does so in reliance 
on the integrity of that price. Because most publicly available information is reflected in market price, 
an investor’s reliance on any public material misrepresentations, therefore, may be presumed for 
purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action.”). 
87 See id. 
88 See Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., 131 S. Ct. 2179, 2185 (2011). 
89 See, e.g., Olson, supra note 34, at 937–38.  
90 Id. at 935. 
91 Id. at 966 (discussing how a merits inquiry at certification can create expense and burden for the 
parties and court, using Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001), as an example). 
92 Id. 
93 Complaint, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (No. C01-02253) 
(filed June 8, 2001); Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 
F.R.D. 137 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (No. C01-02253) (filed Apr. 28, 2003).  
94 Brief for Respondents at 10–11, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 10-
277), 2011 WL 686407, at *10–11 (“After extensive discovery, including over 200 depositions, 
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The claim that the overlap interpretation is incorrect rests on Rule 23’s 
text. Both the commonality and predominance requirements demand 
“common questions.”95 Whether a pattern or practice exists or whether the 
market for a particular security is efficient are both questions. And they are 
common to all the class members in any discrimination or securities class 
action. Textually, commonality and predominance are satisfied so long as 
the plaintiffs allege them. The answer to the common question—yes, the 
market is efficient; no, there is no pattern or practice—is therefore 
irrelevant to certification. In other words, the overlap interpretation 
demands common answers, not common questions, and is therefore a faulty 
reading of the rule. In other words, the only way to square the overlap 
interpretation with the rule’s text is to say that if the answer to a common 
question is “no,” then the rule treats the question as if it doesn’t exist. 
This criticism hasn’t been well addressed. One illustration comes from 
a securities fraud class action filed in the Middle District of Louisiana. The 
trial judge rejected the overlap interpretation and granted certification.96 
The judge called two decisions applying the overlap interpretation 
“troubling,” adding that “whether the putative plaintiffs in this proposed 
class are entitled to the Basic presumption of reliance based on market 
efficiency is clearly a common question of law and fact that applies to each 
individual class member.”97 The trial judge ruled that predominance was 
satisfied so long as the plaintiff alleged an efficient market.98 The Fifth 
Circuit reversed, adopting the overlap interpretation.99 It is telling, I think, 
that the Fifth Circuit did not answer the lower court’s questions about the 
overlap interpretation. 
Several scholars have suggested that concern for defendants has led 
judges to ignore the textual flaws with the overlap interpretation: “It 
appears that one reason courts are scrutinizing the merits more closely may 
have to do with a concern about improper settlement leverage, and in 
particular the risk that certification might pressure unjustified settlements in 
frivolous and weak class action suits.”100 Whatever may be behind the 
overlap interpretation’s acceptance, its proponents have yet to offer a 
convincing defense of its logic. 
 
production of more than a million pages of documents, and electronic personnel data, plaintiffs 
assembled a massive record to support class certification.”). 
95 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2), (b)(3). 
96 See Unger v. Amedisys, Inc., No. 01-703, 2003 WL 25739165, at *7 (M.D. La. Aug. 1, 2003), 
vacated, 401 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[A]ny doubts as to the merits of Plaintiffs’ case are not a reason 
to deny class certification.”). 
97 Id. at *6. 
98 See id. at *7.  
99 Unger, 401 F.3d at 324–25. 
100 Robert G. Bone, Sorting Through the Certification Muddle, 63 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 105, 
109–10 (2010). 
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D. The Preponderance Standard 
Rule 23 clearly says what the certification requirements are but does 
not instruct the judge to use any particular standard to decide when they 
have been met.101 It is interesting that even though the relevant text of Rule 
23 has not changed,102 judges have progressed over the past four decades 
from granting certification based on the allegations in the plaintiff’s 
complaint to requiring that the plaintiff demonstrate compliance with each 
element by a preponderance of the evidence.103 Preponderance is now the 
consensus in the federal courts.104 
The move to preponderance is significant to jury certification. It is 
important that the certification standard is no higher—i.e., not clear and 
convincing evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt—than the standard used 
in civil jury trials. If the certification standard were higher, then the jury’s 
finding might not properly be able to substitute for that of the judge. 
Because both the judge and the jury are deciding the same fact (whether the 
security trades on an efficient market) on the same standard 
(preponderance), jury certification is possible. 
II. THE INS AND OUTS OF JURY CERTIFICATION 
This Part has two sections. Section A explains jury certification step-
by-step. Section B raises possible defenses to jury certification. Some of 
these defenses may defeat jury certification in a particular case, but none 
rob it of its viability or reveal it to be fundamentally unsound. 
A. Jury Certification: Step-by-Step 
In this section, I will identify what needs to happen during the 
progress of a lawsuit for jury certification to work. To present this 
information, I have broken this section into seven subsections: the denial of 
 
101 The entire rule and the advisory committee notes are silent.  
102 The text of Rules 23(a) and 23(b) has not been substantially amended since 1966. In 1966, 
commonality under Rule 23(a) required “questions of law or fact common to the class,” exactly as it 
does now. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) (1966). Likewise, the 1966 version of Rule 23(b)(3) is very 
similar—and identical in meaning—to the current version. In 1966, the rule required that “questions of 
law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only 
individual members.” Id. 23(b)(3) (1966). Now, it reads “questions of law or fact common to class 
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.” Id. 23(b)(3). 
103 Compare Richerson v. Fargo, 61 F.R.D. 641, 642 (E.D. Pa. 1974), vacated 64 F.R.D. 393 (E.D. 
Pa. 1974) (“[T]he weight of authority has held that in such cases where a pattern of discrimination is 
alleged, the common questions of law and fact predominate.” (emphasis added)), with Meyer v. 
Macmillan Publ’g Co., 95 F.R.D. 411, 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (“We conclude that plaintiffs have 
provided sufficient evidence of the existence of a class as to whom there are common questions of law 
and fact.” (emphasis added)).  
104 See, e.g., Behrend v. Comcast Corp., 655 F.3d 182, 190 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Plaintiffs bear the 
burden of establishing each element of Rule 23 by a preponderance of the evidence.”). 
107:1851 (2013) Jury Certification 
1867 
certification, giving notice, getting to the jury, possible settlement, winning 
at trial, the two paths to jury certification, and a summary. 
1. The Denial of Certification.—Obviously, if the judge grants the 
plaintiff’s motion for class certification, then there is no need for jury 
certification. If, however, certification is denied, jury certification will not 
always be possible. Rather, the judge must deny certification in a specific 
way. Namely, the judge must find that all the certification requirements are 
satisfied except for the overlapped requirement: predominance. Further, the 
judge must conclude that the only reason that predominance is not satisfied 
is because the plaintiff failed to prove market efficiency. The judge must 
decide in favor of the plaintiff on all the other certification requirements 
because the jury cannot reach them. As it turns out, securities fraud class 
actions are routinely denied class certification solely on the basis of the 
plaintiff’s inability to prove market efficiency.105 Accordingly, securities 
class action attorneys have opportunities to try jury certification. 
2. Giving Notice.—Following the judge’s denial of certification, the 
plaintiff should give notice to the defendant of two things: that she will ask 
for certification again after trial and that she will attempt to prove market 
efficiency at trial. This means that the plaintiff must, in her individual trial, 
prove reliance by invoking the fraud-on-the-market presumption, the same 
as she would if she were officially representing the class. This amounts to 
telling the defendant that the trial will be a rematch of the parties’ 
certification arguments and evidence on market efficiency. 
Without notice, the defendant might not realize the full stakes of the 
litigation. A defendant who is aware of the possibility of jury certification 
may litigate more aggressively than one who isn’t. The latter defendant 
might, when jury certification comes up—as I’ll discuss briefly—claim to 
be unfairly prejudiced. And that prejudice can weigh against jury 
certification in either its Rule 23(c) or collateral-estoppel forms. But, if the 
plaintiff tells the defendant what the true stakes of the litigation are, then 
any lack of aggression is the result of the defendant’s informed choice, and 
not a source of unfair prejudice. 
3. Getting to the Jury.—At this point, after certification has been 
denied and notice given, the case may be ripe for settlement. A defendant 
who has no confidence in her ability to win summary judgment is in almost 
the same position at this point as she would have been had the class been 
certified. That is, the defendant must choose whether to settle now or risk 
liability to the class at trial. As both sides of the blackmail debate agree, 
this pressure has the capacity to induce settlement.106 
 
105 See supra note 14. 
106 See supra notes 53–64.  
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If, on the other hand, the defendant has a plausible summary 
judgment107 argument, then the defendant will be less inclined to settle. In 
the situation I’ve just described the defendant will likely have just such an 
argument: that the market is not efficient. After all, the judge in my 
hypothetical has just denied class certification, using a preponderance 
standard, on the very ground that the market was not efficient. Any 
reasonable defendant, having received notice that the plaintiff will attempt 
jury certification, will try to build on their momentum and file a summary 
judgment motion attacking market efficiency. The judge’s certification 
finding is not binding on the jury.108 Summary judgment, of course, would 
be. So to keep the hope of jury certification alive, the plaintiff must avoid 
summary judgment on market efficiency. 
The plaintiff can do this by focusing on the difference in the standards 
used on certification and summary judgment. Certification uses 
preponderance;109 summary judgment, the “reasonable juror” standard.110 
Summary judgment should only be granted when there is “no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.”111 A dispute is “genuine” only if reasonable jurors could 
disagree about its outcome.112 And since the standard that jurors employ in 
a civil case is, like in certification, one of preponderance, this means that if 
no reasonable juror could find by a preponderance of the evidence for one 
of the parties on a particular issue, then there is no genuine dispute as to 
that issue, and summary judgment should be granted.113 
Preponderance is a higher standard than the reasonable juror standard. 
The plaintiff seeking jury certification must oppose summary judgment by 
convincing the judge that, although the plaintiff failed to show market 
efficiency by a preponderance at the certification stage, her evidence is 
sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to find market efficiency by a 
preponderance. In other words, the plaintiff’s task is to convince the judge 
that a reasonable juror could disagree with her about market efficiency. 
 
107 I ignore judgment as a matter of law for two reasons. First, it is based on the same standard as 
summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (“Petitioners suggest, 
and we agree, that this standard mirrors the standard for a directed verdict . . . .”). Thus, the defendant’s 
estimate of his chances of success is not likely to differ between the two motions. And second, as far as 
jury certification is concerned, the effect of summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law is the 
same: if the defendant wins, jury certification does not work. 
108 Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 2004) (“The jury or factfinder can 
be given free hand to find all of the facts required to render a verdict on the merits, and if its finding on 
any fact differs from a finding made in connection with class action certification, the ultimate 
factfinder’s finding on the merits will govern the judgment.”). 
109 See supra Part I.D. 
110 See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. 
111 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).  
112 See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. 
113 Id. 
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Whether this task is doable is highly contextual. It will depend on 
specific facts and case law. But there is reason to believe that the space 
between preponderance and the reasonable juror standard is large enough 
to give plaintiffs a reasonable chance of success. This is because the verbal 
formulation of the reasonable juror standard, which makes it sound very 
close to a preponderance, does not reflect the deference many judges show 
to juries in practice.114 Accordingly, even though there may not seem to be 
much room between a preponderance (full stop) and what reasonable 
people could deem a preponderance, in practice, judges are willing to let 
the word “reasonable” do a lot of work. Moreover, the plaintiff will have 
the benefit of the judge’s certification opinion, which will likely identify 
where the judge thought the plaintiff’s evidence was lacking. A savvy 
plaintiff might revise her presentation or seek additional evidence to 
address these concerns in preparation for opposing a summary judgment 
motion. 
4. Possible Settlement.—Assuming the judge denies summary 
judgment, or the defendant does not wish to risk injuring its bargaining 
position by moving for summary judgment and losing, then the defendant 
may settle. This presents an unresolved issue of law. While it is not unusual 
for judges to certify classes for settlement purposes,115 there are no reported 
cases of a judge doing so immediately after denying certification, as would 
happen here. The question is therefore whether the defendant’s newfound 
willingness to concede certification trumps the judge’s prior determination 
that certification was inappropriate. There are several reasons to believe it 
should. 
First, Rule 23 allows judges to amend or alter denials of certification 
prior to final judgment.116 There is, therefore, no question of authority. 
Second, it’s the defendant’s funeral. The judge has no remaining 
institutional interest in protecting the denial of certification for its own 
sake;117 doing so only delays the litigation’s resolution. Third, there is no 
prejudice to absent class members. Their interests are independently 
protected by the requirement that the judge approve the settlement’s 
terms.118 Fourth, it is well recognized in overlap classes that the judge’s 
 
114 See Martin H. Redish, Summary Judgment and the Vanishing Trial: Implications of the 
Litigation Matrix, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1329, 1334 (2005).  
115 See 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19, § 1797.2 (collecting cases). 
116 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C).  
117 A judge might refuse certification, even where the parties agree to it, to protect the interests of 
the absent class members. In the case of a certification for settlement purposes, Rule 23 instructs judges 
to consider whether those interests were adequately served under the Rule 23(a)(4) requirement of 
adequacy. See id. 23(e)(2). Here, that requirement was, by hypothesis, found to have been satisfied 
when the judge denied certification (recall that for jury certification to work, the judge must find all the 
other requirements satisfied, so we assume here that she did). 
118 See id. 23(e). 
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decision on the overlapped element is not final.119 It has always been a 
possibility that the jury would disagree with the judge at trial when 
deciding the case’s merits. Here, that disagreement merely comes from 
another source—the defendant—and a little bit sooner than might 
otherwise be expected. 
Finally, it seems unlikely that, in the absence of some legal directive 
or prejudice, a judge is likely to fight too hard against parties that wish to 
settle. There is an acknowledged judicial policy in favor of settlement.120 
Settlement saves time and resources, both the parties’ and the court’s. 
Where, as here, the alternative means continued complicated litigation, it 
seems unlikely that the judge would turn a willing defendant away. 
5. Winning the Trial.—Assuming the case neither settles nor ends at 
summary judgment, the plaintiff must, of course, win the trial to keep the 
possibility of jury certification alive. Specifically, the plaintiff must win in 
a way that makes it clear that the jury decided the overlapped element—
market efficiency—in its favor.121 When the overlapped element is a 
necessary element of the plaintiff’s claim this takes care of itself. But, if the 
plaintiff presented alternative theories—individual reliance and the fraud-
on-the-market presumption—then the plaintiff must use Rule 49(b).122 
Rule 49(b) allows the jury to enter a general verdict—i.e., the plaintiff 
wins, or the defendant wins—but also requires it to respond to individual 
fact questions.123 In this case, the plaintiff will want to include as a fact 
question the overlapped element: was the relevant market efficient during 
the relevant time period?124 If only a general verdict is returned or the 
 
119 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2552 n.6 (2011) (“[The overlapped issue 
is] an issue they will surely have to prove again at trial in order to make out their case on the merits.”); 
Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 152–53, 60 (1982) (remanding with instructions to decertify the 
class following a post-trial appeal of class judgment).  
120 In re MetLife Demutualization Litig., 689 F. Supp. 2d 297, 330 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (“There is a 
‘strong judicial policy in favor of settlements, particularly in the class action context.’” (quoting 
McReynolds v. Richards-Cantave, 588 F.3d 790, 803 (2d Cir. 2009))). 
121 Otherwise, collateral estoppel will not work. For a judgment to collaterally estop relitigation of 
a fact in a later case, the determination of that exact same fact must have been necessary to the 
judgment in a prior case. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982) (“When an 
issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the 
determination is essential to the judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action 
between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim.”). 
122 FED. R. CIV. P. 49(b). 
123 See id. 
124 In particular, the plaintiff will want to make sure the question encompasses the scope—in time 
and place—of the class’s claims, i.e., not just “Did the defendant operate under a pattern or practice of 
discrimination?” but “Did the defendant operate under a pattern or practice of discrimination at its 
Austin, Texas facilities between June 2010 and January 2012?” Collateral estoppel can be defeated if 
the issue decided in the prior litigation is not the exact same issue to be determined. See RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). Accordingly, care is necessary to draft the jury question. For the 
same reason, if the plaintiff is relying on a general verdict, then the plaintiff’s claim should 
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question is answered in the negative, then there is no basis to conclude that 
the jury actually decided the overlapped element, and neither path to jury 
certification will work. 
Unfortunately, parties have no right to demand that questions be 
submitted under Rule 49(b).125 In practice, the decision to submit a question 
to the jury rests in the absolute discretion of the trial court.126 Accordingly, 
there is an element of risk here that would be minimized by proceeding 
under a single theory—i.e., trying to prove reliance with the fraud-on-the-
market presumption alone. Plaintiffs who want to use the presumption and 
individual reliance will want to emphasize their trial strategy with the judge 
early and often, so that, when the Rule 49(b) request comes, the judge 
understands its importance.127 
6. Three Paths to Jury Certification.—If the jury returns a verdict 
that necessarily includes a finding in favor of the plaintiff on market 
efficiency, then jury certification remains viable under either of two 
approaches. The first is to make a motion to amend the order denying 
certification. The second is to allow the case to proceed to final judgment 
and then use that judgment as collateral estoppel in a second, identical class 
action. A variation on this second option—what I called the “third path” in 
the Introduction—is to skip the motion for certification in the first case, 
litigating the whole case as an individual securities fraud action and relying 
on the fraud-on-the-market theory for reliance. 
a. An amendment motion.—A motion to amend the order 
denying certification raises three sets of issues: the judge’s authority to 
grant the motion, the motion’s merits, and the judge’s discretion to grant or 
deny the motion independent of its merits. 
Rule 23(c)(1)(C) authorizes judges to “alter[] or amend[]” an order 
which “denies” certification until final judgment is entered.128 Accordingly, 
so long as the motion is made between the return of the verdict and final 
judgment, the rule appears to authorize the motion. Judges, in fact, often 
 
encompass—in time, place, etc.—the class’s claims. For this reason, it may be necessary to try two or 
more individual cases so that the judgment necessarily encompasses the full scope of the class’s claims. 
125 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 49(b) (“The court may submit to the jury forms for a general verdict, 
together with written questions on one or more issues of fact . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
126 9B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 2505 (3d ed. 2008) (“Although, as noted earlier in the discussion, there are frequent judicial 
statements in the reported cases that the district court’s decision whether or not to use a special verdict 
under Rule 49(a) is reviewable by the court of appeals only for abuse of discretion, there appears never 
to have been a reversal on this ground.” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). 
127 Judges have almost unreviewable discretion to allow special questions to be put to the jury. 
Accordingly, it is important that the judge understand why the questions are significant.  
128 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C).  
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entertain post-trial motions to amend certification orders.129 The most 
common of these is likely the motion to decertify, but at least one judge has 
amended an order to expand the class definition, thereby adding class 
members after trial.130 A strong argument in favor of approving the motion 
is that the rule’s text offers no reason to treat a motion to amend that 
reverses a denial of certification differently from one that reverses a grant; 
if judges routinely do one—and they do131—then the other is not 
problematic simply for being less common. 
The merits of a motion to amend raise two issues. The first is whether, 
setting aside the overlapped element, anything else has changed in the 
certification calculus. Sometimes, trial reveals facts to the judge that, while 
not bearing on the merits of the dispute, give rise to grounds for 
decertification132 (thus, the post-trial decertification motions mentioned in 
the last paragraph). If nothing like that arises, then the second issue is 
whether the judge will choose to credit the jury’s finding on market 
efficiency over her own prior finding. If the judge credits the jury, then she 
should grant the motion and certify the class.133 
There is, however, no case law or rule that compels the judge to 
abandon her prior finding in favor of the jury’s. But even though the 
motion to amend cannot force the judge to accept the jury’s finding, there 
are three reasons to expect that the judge, nonetheless, will. First, the jury 
made its decision based on a more developed presentation. Although 
discovery was perhaps complete when the certification decision was 
made,134 regardless, the jury would have benefitted from live testimony 
rather than paper, as well as from any changes the parties made to their 
arguments in response to the judge’s certification finding. It is reasonable 
to expect, after all, that the lawyers on both sides will have developed their 
arguments between certification and trial. (Who knows? Maybe the second 
presentation of the issue will secretly change the judge’s mind too.) 
The next two reasons are related. The first is that it might be unseemly 
for a judge to disagree with a jury verdict immediately following that 
 
129 See 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19 (“Courts have modified or decertified classes at . . . the 
completion of the trial on the merits.”).  
130 Kilgo v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 789 F.2d 859, 877–78 (11th Cir. 1986) (permitting a post-trial 
expansion of the class). 
131 See, e.g., Payne v. Travenol Labs., Inc., 673 F.2d 798, 811 (5th Cir. 1982) (“The district court 
may decertify a class after trial . . . .”). 
132 See 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19 (“[T]he action always can be decertified or the class 
description altered if later events suggest that it is appropriate to do so.”).  
133 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c) advisory committee’s note (2003) (“A court that is not satisfied that 
the requirements of Rule 23 have been met should refuse certification until they have been met.”). This 
statement implies that, once the court is satisfied that the requirements have been met, there is no reason 
not to certify. 
134 See Olson, supra note 34, at 954–56 (indicating that judges will allow plaintiffs to take merits 
discovery prior to class certification in overlap cases). 
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verdict. The judge does not have to accept the jury’s verdict on the 
overlapped element in the motion to amend context, but that verdict will no 
doubt control the liability of the defendant. If the judge were to accept the 
finding for liability’s sake but refuse to acknowledge it on the motion to 
amend, it would send an unflattering message about the judge’s estimation 
of the jury, detracting from the perceived legitimacy of the civil justice 
system, generally, and the civil jury, specifically. 
One complicating factor, which is the third reason that the judge may 
choose to acknowledge the jury’s finding, is the Seventh Amendment’s 
right to jury trial.135 Seventh Amendment jurisprudence is notoriously 
convoluted.136 The Seventh Amendment surely doesn’t force the judge to 
accept the jury’s finding, but the judge doing so would not be out of line 
with what courts have said about the overlap interpretation—namely, that 
the judge’s finding cannot bind the jury137—or with the charge leveled at 
the overlap interpretation by critics that it interferes with the plaintiff’s 
Seventh Amendment rights.138 Acquiescing in the jury’s opinion avoids the 
issue entirely. 
The final issue raised by the motion to amend is the judge’s discretion. 
Even if the judge accepts the motion on the merits and acknowledges her 
authority to grant it, she does not have to. Motions under Rule 23(c)(1)(C) 
are discretionary.139 In other post-trial motions under 23(c)(1)(C), discretion 
has been tied to prejudice, which has been tied to notice. Obviously, 
granting the motion does not prejudice the plaintiff or the absent class 
members. But it might unfairly prejudice a defendant if that defendant had 
been unaware that the trial was really a class trial in disguise. A reasonable 
defendant would be unlikely to expend the same amount of effort and 
resources on an individual case as on a class case. Accordingly, informing 
the defendant of the true stakes of the case is key to affording her a full and 
fair opportunity to litigate. This is why I suggest giving notice above. 
b. A second class action.—All is not lost if the judge denies the 
motion to amend or if the plaintiff prefers not to file that motion. The 
alternative is to proceed to final judgment in the individual case and then 
 
135 U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
136 Martin H. Redish, Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of 
Rational Decision Making, 70 NW. U. L. REV. 486, 486–87 (1975) (describing the difficulty and 
confusion in Seventh Amendment analysis). 
137 Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 2004) (“The jury or factfinder can 
be given free hand to find all of the facts required to render a verdict on the merits, and if its finding on 
any fact differs from a finding made in connection with class action certification, the ultimate 
factfinder’s finding on the merits will govern the judgment.”). 
138 See Olson, supra note 34, at 938 (criticizing overlap interpretation as abridging the jury trial 
right). 
139 7AA WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 19 (“However, it must be noted that there is no requirement 
that the court alter its class-action order when the circumstances surrounding its initial determination 
change. The decision to amend a class-certification order is discretionary.”).  
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file an identical class action with a new named plaintiff. Then, the new 
class should move for class certification and use collateral estoppel to 
prevent the defendant from arguing that the market is efficient.140 Collateral 
estoppel, generally, prevents a party from contesting an issue that was 
determined against it in a prior case if it had a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate the issue (again, this requires notice of the stakes in the first case), 
and it is clear that the judgment encompasses the issue (thus, the special 
questions under Rule 49(b)).141 
With the overlapped element established, the nonoverlapped 
certification requirements remain. While the second judge is not required to 
find these in the plaintiff’s favor, the first judge’s decision on this point 
will be persuasive both on stare decisis and comity grounds.142 So, 
presumably, the second judge will decide the remaining requirements in the 
plaintiff’s favor, and therefore certify the class. 
Depending on the specific facts of the case, collateral estoppel may 
also be able to establish other elements of the class’s claims as well. This 
advantage could be significant, as it would mean that the defendant 
effectively begins the case with the class certified and, potentially, 
summary judgment entered against it on liability. Rather than try to fight 
with those disabilities, a reasonable defendant would probably settle. 
c. Two cases: one motion for certification.—The collateral 
estoppel option works even if the plaintiff never moves for class 
certification in the first case. This is the third path. If the plaintiff takes an 
individual case or a case with a few individual plaintiffs to trial and wins, 
then that judgment can be used for collateral estoppel in a follow-up class 
action in much the same manner as I describe above. 
7. Summary.—One way to view jury certification is that, in the eyes 
of the risk-averse defendant, it transforms a denial of certification into a 
grant of certification whenever the defendant is less than confident that she 
can use summary judgment to prevent a trial. Jury certification requires 
only (1) a class action subject to the overlap interpretation,143 (2) a denial of 
certification based solely on the overlapped element,144 and (3) notice to the 
 
140 See generally Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326–33 (1979) (describing use 
of collateral estoppel in a securities case). 
141 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982) (“When an issue of fact or law is 
actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the 
judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the 
same or a different claim.”). 
142 See Smith v. Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. 2368, 2382 (2011) (“[W]e would expect federal courts to 
apply principles of comity to each other’s class certification decisions when addressing a common 
dispute.”). 
143 See supra Part I.C. 
144 See supra Part II.A.1. 
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defendant.145 The steps required to obtain jury certification, although not 
established with directly-on-point case law, are each, individually 
considered, relatively slight variations on current practices. 
Thus, the strategy is viable. And there are two additional 
considerations that make it more so. First, it does not actually have to work 
in the sense of getting the class certified post-trial to work in the sense of 
producing a settlement. As long as it appears viable enough to the 
defendant, it will induce risk-averse defendants to settle. Second, there is 
little incremental cost and risk to the plaintiff (and her attorney) in 
attempting jury certification. In overlap cases most of the discovery 
necessary to try the case may well be concluded before the certification 
motion is filed.146 That cost is sunk. And even though the cost of trying the 
case will likely be substantial, this cost should be weighed against the 
potential recovery for the entire class. Aside from cost, there is the lack of 
risk to the absent class members’ claims to consider. If the plaintiff loses at 
trial, only the individual plaintiff’s claim, now fairly adjudicated, is 
extinguished. The class’s claims remain viable because the class was never 
certified and therefore the adverse judgment against a member of the class 
has no impact. Theoretically, the plaintiff’s attorney can continue to retry 
the case until she runs out of representative plaintiffs.147 
B. Defenses to Jury Certification 
I will now consider some countermeasures that defendants might 
employ if threatened with jury certification. In particular cases, some of 
these options may prevent the case from ever becoming a certified class 
action. In addition, the substantial amount of discretion that judges have at 
various points on the path to jury certification may be exercised in the 
defendant’s favor and to the same effect. Yet, neither these 
countermeasures nor judicial discretion is a guaranteed shield. This is 
significant, because jury certification retains its viability as a negotiating 
chip so long as there is no surefire way to defeat it. 
1. Summary Judgment.—One defensive option is to move for 
summary judgment immediately after class certification is denied, targeting 
the overlapped element.148 This allows the summary judgment motion to 
 
145 See supra Part II.A.2. 
146 See Olson, supra note 34 (indicating that judges will allow plaintiffs to take merits discovery 
prior to class certification in overlap cases). 
147 There may be practical limits—the availability of class representatives, finances, etc.—but it is 
now clear that a decision not to certify a class does not bind the members of that would-be class. See 
Bayer Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 2382 (“[T]he mere proposal of a class in the federal action could not bind 
persons who were not parties there.”). 
148 Summary judgment in federal court is not limited to entire claims or defenses. It can be targeted 
at specific facts or issues. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (“A party may move for summary judgment, identifying 
each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought.”). 
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build on the momentum of the denial of certification. The judge just 
decided by a preponderance of the evidence that the market was not 
efficient.149 She may, therefore, be willing to grant summary judgment if 
the defendant can convince her that the plaintiff’s evidence of the 
overlapped element fails to meet the “reasonable juror” standard, as well.150 
2. Rule 68 Offers of Judgment.—Rule 68 allows a defendant to offer 
judgment on specific terms to the plaintiff.151 If the plaintiff accepts, the 
case is over. If the plaintiff declines the offer but ultimately recovers less 
than what was offered, then the plaintiff must pay whatever costs were 
incurred by the defendant from the date of the rejected offer forward.152 
First, I will describe how a defendant might use Rule 68 to avoid jury 
certification. Then, I will discuss the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
Rule 68 as a countermeasure. 
Rule 68 has been used in the class action context to “buy off” the 
individual plaintiff.153 The buy-off moots the case, stripping the court of 
subject matter jurisdiction and, thereby, preventing a class from ever being 
certified.154 Timing is critical. In the circuits where this strategy is available, 
the offer usually must come before the class certification motion is filed.155 
Otherwise, the absent class members are said to have a “stake” in the case; 
thus, mooting the individual plaintiff’s case will no longer moot the entire 
case.156 
It is unclear whether a buy-off would work after the plaintiff is denied 
certification when that plaintiff intends to attempt jury certification. No 
court has decided whether the absent class members retain a stake in 
certification under these circumstances. If they do, then buy-off will not be 
an effective countermeasure against jury certification. One reason to think 
that the absent class members would retain a stake when the plaintiff 
intends to seek jury certification is that denials of certification are 
appealable157 and amendable.158 If the case can be mooted by a buy-off, 
then, in effect, the appealability and amendability provisions of Rule 23 are 
meaningless. Still, it is likely worth it for the defendant to argue that, once 
class certification is denied, the case can be mooted with an offer to the 
individual plaintiff, if for no other reason than that the point is unsettled. 
 
149 See supra note 104. 
150 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). 
151 FED. R. CIV. P. 68(a). 
152 Id. 68(d). 
153 Pitts v. Terrible Herbst, Inc., 653 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 2011).  
154 Id.; Rand v. Monsanto Co., 926 F.2d 596, 597–98 (7th Cir. 1991). 
155 See, e.g., Damasco v. Clearwire Corp., 662 F.3d 891, 895 (7th Cir. 2011).  
156 See id.  
157  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f). 
158 Id. 23(c)(1)(C). 
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That said, there are two related problems that make the buy-off option 
risky for defendants. First, it can be expensive. To moot the individual 
plaintiff’s claim, the defendant will need to offer the entire value of that 
claim and attorneys’ fees and costs.159 Since precertification discovery in 
overlap class actions is apt to be expensive,160 this strategy is unlikely to be 
cheap even if the individual plaintiff’s damages are low. 
The related problem is determining what the correct buy-off amount 
should be. The offer is invalid, meaning that it will not moot the case, 
unless it represents the full value of the plaintiff’s claim.161 The cases where 
buy-offs have been used successfully to date are ones involving fixed, 
statutory damages. When damages are set, there is no difficulty calculating 
the appropriate amount.162 In securities cases, calculating individual 
damages for a correct buy-off amount is likely to be more difficult.163 
A final note is that there is little, if any, risk that by offering judgment 
the defendant will simply allow a different plaintiff to use the judgment to 
certify a class in another case by collateral estoppel. Consent judgments, of 
which Rule 68 offers a species, rarely support collateral estoppel.164 
Typically, collateral estoppel is only allowed on consent judgments when 
the judgment indicates that this was the parties’ intent.165 
3. “One-Way” Intervention.—“One-way” intervention was a 
problem associated with a version of Rule 23 that no longer exists.166 When 
the rule was first adopted in 1938, there was a type of class action, called 
the “spurious” class action, which had no binding effect on the rights of 
absent class members unless and until the absentee intervened as a party.167 
The problem was that, practically, this allowed absentees to wait until the 
merits of the case were decided, and then intervene only if their side won.168 
If their side lost, the absentee could just file an individual suit rather than 
 
159 See Rand, 926 F.2d at 597–98. 
160 See supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
161 See Damasco, 662 F.3d at 893–94 (involving statute with a maximum possible recovery of 
$1500 per violation and a settlement letter offering the individual plaintiff and “up to ten other affected 
people $1,500 for each text message received from Clearwire, plus court costs”).  
162 See, e.g., id. 
163 Damages in securities class actions are notoriously difficult to calculate, involving competing 
experts and dueling economics and complex mathematical models. If interested, wade in cautiously: 
Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 
1488–89 (1996); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Reassessing Damages in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 
66 MD. L. REV. 348, 349 (2007); Bradford Cornell & R. Gregory Morgan, Using Finance Theory to 
Measure Damages in Fraud on the Market Cases, 37 UCLA L. REV. 883, 884 (1990). 
164 18A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 4443 (2d ed. 2002).  
165 Id. 
166 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 (1938). 
167 Id. 
168 FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note (1966).  
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intervene because the class’s loss did not bind her. The rulemakers sought 
to abolish one-way intervention in 1966. They eliminated the “spurious” 
class action and encouraged judges to decide certification before deciding 
the merits.169 
Defendants might argue that jury certification is, in effect, one-way 
intervention and, therefore, is impermissible. Admittedly, there is a 
resemblance. In both jury certification and in one-way intervention, the 
absent class members’ rights do not become subject to alteration until the 
merits of their claims have already been decided in their favor. 
There are three reasons to think that, in spite of this resemblance, the 
one-way intervention argument will not defeat jury certification. The first is 
textual. Rule 23 does not prohibit one-way intervention explicitly, but it 
does explicitly allow a denial of certification to be modified after trial.170 
This creates a tension because there is no way to modify a post-trial denial 
of certification that does not, in some way, resemble one-way intervention. 
To modify a denial, part of the denial must be revoked. This means that 
either absent class members that were initially excluded from the class 
definition must be let in, or claims that were not certified must now be 
certified. Either way, the result resembles one-way intervention and is 
clearly countenanced by the rule. 
The second reason not to credit the one-way intervention argument is 
precedent. Judges have already considered and rejected the “looks like 
‘one-way’ intervention” argument in the context of amending class 
definitions after trial.171 The final reason is practical. Even if one-way 
intervention is held to preclude a motion to amend that reverses a denial of 
certification, the same result can be achieved with nonmutual, offensive 
collateral estoppel, as discussed above. This has practical and doctrinal 
significance. 
The practical significance is that collateral estoppel achieves the same 
result but with more litigation and, therefore, higher cost. The doctrinal 
significance is a little more complicated. When one-way intervention was 
“abolished” in 1966, a plaintiff could not use collateral estoppel based on a 
judgment to which she was not a party. This was an element of the doctrine 
of mutuality.172 In its fullest form, the doctrine of mutuality meant that only 
a party to a judgment could invoke that judgment for res judicata or 
collateral estoppel.173 In other words, a jury certification/collateral estoppel 
strategy would not have worked in 1966, whatever the merits of the “one-
 
169 Id. 
170 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C). 
171 Amati v. City of Woodstock, 176 F.3d 952, 957 (7th Cir. 1999) (discussing one-way 
intervention in the context of amendment motions under 23(c)). 
172 See RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 1186–87 (5th ed. 
2009) (discussing mutuality and the breach of mutuality).  
173 Id. 
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way” intervention argument, because the plaintiff in the second class action 
could not have used the prior judgment against the defendant since she was 
not a party to the first case. 
Today, mutuality is gone.174 Anyone can use a judgment against a 
party to that judgment, whether the user was a party to it or not. Without 
mutuality, prohibiting tactics that resemble “one-way” intervention is, 
practically speaking, impossible—the second plaintiff can now achieve 
through collateral estoppel what, before, would only have been possible 
through intervention. Accordingly, the decisions that broke mutuality 
should be taken as a judgment that the kind of unfairness sought to be 
prohibited by stopping “one-way” intervention is no longer an overriding 
systemic concern. 
CONCLUSION 
I would like to conclude by summarizing a key point, making a 
suggestion, and noting an irony. The key point is for the plaintiff’s 
securities fraud bar: whenever class certification is denied solely based on 
market inefficiency, abandoning the case means leaving the class’s money 
on the table. The main point of this Note has been to show that a denial of 
certification, under certain circumstances, can put the defendant in the 
same position as a grant of certification—forced to decide between settling 
and risking class-wide liability at trial. 
The suggestion I have is for judges and scholars concerned about class 
actions and class certification. I have tried to avoid the normative here and 
instead focused on what I feel is a viable but as-yet-untested application of 
existing law. I am not, however, blind to the normative implications of jury 
certification. My suggestion is that those looking to categorize jury 
certification consider grouping it with the other recognized flaws of the 
overlap interpretation. As I noted above, the overlap interpretation is 
textually unjustifiable and costly for the parties. It is also what allows the 
jury to certify. Juries are the masters of a case’s merits and only by 
overlapping the merits with certification are juries given a say on 
certification. Therefore, if jury certification is troubling, so too should be 
the overlap interpretation. 
Finally, I will note an irony. As I mentioned above, the overlap 
interpretation—which allows for jury certification—is likely the product of 
scholarly and judicial sympathy.175 That sympathy, in turn, is based on the 
pressure that class action defendants feel to settle when faced with a 
certified class.176 In other words, the overlap interpretation was meant to 
 
174 Id. 
175 See Bone, supra note 100; Olson, supra note 34, at 939 (suggesting that judicial sympathy for 
class defendants drove judges to adopt the overlap interpretation).  
176 See Olson supra note 34, at 939. 
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make class certification harder in order to protect defendants from having 
to choose between settlement and the risk of class-wide liability at trial. To 
the extent that observation is accurate, it is ironic that the overlap 
interpretation has the potential to achieve the opposite result by opening the 
door to jury certification. 
 
